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Abstract
This paper examines the e¤ect of the presence of a military ruler on military
expenditure using a panel of sub-Saharan Africa countries. The paper also explores
whether the relationship reects a capture e¤ect, is an outcome of the confrontational
climate of the cold war, or is an e¤ort by military rulers for self-preservation. The
Pooled OLS and xed e¤ects OLS estimations show that the presence of a military
ruler has a statistically signicant negative e¤ect on military spending as a percentage
of GDP. The coe¢cients are also not signicantly di¤erent before or after the end
of the cold war era. This implies that the negative relationship is driven by an
e¤ort by military rulers to preempt the ability of their peers to overthrow them
from power. We also attempt to deal with potential endogeneity, and consider the
possibility of persistence in military spending. The paper uses the Arellano and
Bond (1991) estimation technique that shows a negative but insignicant e¤ect of the
presence of a military ruler on military expenditure, while military spending shows a
high degree of persistence.
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1 Introduction
This paper explores the e¤ect of the presence of a military ruler on military expenditure in
sub-Saharan Africa. The paper also examines whether this relationship reects a capture
e¤ect, is an outcome of the confrontational climate during the cold war era, or indicates a
self-preservation e¤ort by military rulers to protect their power by preempting a takeover
by their military peers.
In this context, the paper attempts to examine if there is a capture e¤ect when the mili-
tary establishment imposes a ruler a¢liated with the armed forces to promote its interests.
Regulatory capture theory, associated with Stigler (1971), posits that regulatory agencies
which are charged with acting in the publics interest can be dominated by the industries or
interests they are supposed to be regulating. In this case, regulatory agencies act in the best
interest of the industries they are supposed to regulate, advance the commercial concerns of
special interest groups that dominate the industries they are charged with regulating, and
prioritize the interests of rms, organizations, or groups over the interests of the public.
This occurs because those who have a stake in the outcome of policies allocate their im-
mense resources to secure the policy outcomes they prefer. This allows these interest groups
to succeed in capturing inuence with the members of the regulatory agency, so that their
preferred policy outcomes are embraced and implemented. These ideas can be applied in
the context of this paper where a countrys leader is supposed to oversee the actions and
the nances of the government agencies, including the military institution. However, when
a countrys leadership is dominated by the agency it is supposed to oversee, a capture e¤ect
can occur. Thus, when the military establishment uses its resources to impose a ruler from
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its midst it will expect a preferential treatment from the countrys leadership to promote
the interests and perquisites of the top brass on the expense of the public. This can be
reected in an increase in military expenditure as a share of national income.
There are several factors to support the argument for a capture e¤ect in this framework.
Military rulers may increase spending by the military establishment to strengthen the ca-
pabilities of the armed forces in order to use its power to impose their will on the entire
populace and to suppress any opposition. A military ruler may increase military expendi-
ture as a bribe to ensure the loyalty of the top brass and to guarantee the allegiance of the
rank-and-le in the armed forces. Military leaders can also increase military spending to
pretend to defend the country from manufactured threats that they concoct as a pretext
for military rule. Finally, military rulers may also increase defense spending in order to
earn commissions that are tied specically to weapons procurement.
Besides a capture e¤ect, an alternative explanation is that the e¤ect of military rule
on military spending is driven by the cold war confrontational climate. This implies that
countries, during the cold war era, had to increase their defense spending to cope with a
highly antagonistic environment where you have to survive in a world squeezed between the
conicting interests of the two super powers. Thus, we cannot attribute a positive associa-
tion between military rule and military spending to a capture e¤ect unless we compare this
relationship before and after the end of the cold war era.
In addition to the previous two explanations of a possible positive association between
military rule and military spending, there is also another potential negative e¤ect driven
by self-preservation. In this context, military rulers attempt to protect their powers by
limiting the ability of their peers in the armed forces to overthrow them. This can be
achieved by allocating resources away from the military establishment. Military rulers
may also want to undermine their peers in the armed forces, by limiting their budgetary
allocations, to prevent their interference in state a¤airs. Military rulers may also reallocate
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resources toward more productive investments to gain the approval of the civilians as a way
to counterbalance any threat from their military peers. Military rulers may also attempt
to portray an image of a powerful leader who instills fear and brings order. This image can
act as a su¢cient deterrent to their military peers, the civilian opposition, and neighboring
powers. This deterrent, thus, precludes the need for a military buildup. In this context,
we would expect that the presence of military rule to have an adverse e¤ect on military
spending.
Some theoretical contributions support these arguments. For instance, Besley and
Robinson (2010) address the question of whether a civilian government should build a
strong army. On one hand, a strong armed forces allows the civilian government to estab-
lish a monopoly of power. On the other hand, the stronger the army the easier it is to mount
a military coup to overthrow the civilian authority and to control the state. The authors
conclude that as the members of the military are self-interested, they have an incentive
to strengthen the army since this allows them to allocate state resources to themselves.
Acemoglu et al. (2010) show that the civilian elite may build a strong army to behave
as their agent. Alternatively, they can face a political moral hazard problem where the
military can turn against the elite and take direct control of the government. Thus, we also
expect a military ruler to either enhance the capacity of the armed forces to stay in power,
or alternatively to limit military capabilities to preempt any takeover of power by his peers.
Our paper can be considered as an empirical estimation of the theoretical ndings in
these papers that attempt to explain the relationship between military rule and military
spending. This paper also attempts to explore whether the relationship reects a capture
e¤ect, is an outcome of the confrontational atmosphere of the cold war, or a self-preservation
endeavor of military rulers to preempt any attempt by their peers to overthrow them from
power. It is worth noting that this line of research is relevant in the current global geopo-
litical environment where democracy is receding before a wave of systems of governance
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centered around strong autocratic leaders. In lots of cases, these strong leaders are a¢li-
ated with the armed forces or have a military background. This is particularly pertinent in
the case of sub-Saharan Africa that used to be one of the elds of confrontation between
the two superpowers during the cold war, but also went through a wave of democratiza-
tion afterwards that is facing signicant challenges nowadays. The e¤ect of that autocratic
trend on military spending has repercussions on the potential of conict worldwide and has
ramications on the future of global security.
To achieve its objective, this paper uses a panel of sub-Saharan African countries to
examine the e¤ect of the presence of the military in power on military spending. The
Pooled OLS and xed e¤ects OLS estimations show that the presence of a military ruler
has a statistically signicant negative e¤ect on military expenditure as a percentage of
Gross Domestic Product GDP. This is the case even after the inclusion of control variables
such as GDP per capita, ethnic fractionalization, an oil dummy, the occurrence of conict,
democracy, and the degree of openness. This implies that the results do not reect a capture
e¤ect. We also consider the relationship between military rule and military spending during
the cold war and in the post cold war era, after 1990. The results show that the coe¢cient
is negative before and after the end of the cold war. This implies that the results are
not driven by the cold war confrontational climate either. These results, however, imply
that the relationship is driven by a self-preservation attempt by military rulers to protect
themselves from their peers and to appeal to the public to counterbalance the power of the
military establishment.
Finally, the key di¢culty in determining a causal e¤ect of the presence of a military
ruler on military expenditure is that the former is endogenous to the latter. As much as
the presence of a military ruler can increase military spending, it is also possible that an
increase in military spending allows the military establishment to be su¢ciently powerful
to impose a ruler from its ranks. Thus, we expect that a high level of military expenditure
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may lead to the installation of military rulers. There is also the possibility of persistence
in military spending. If a country increases its defense spending this year, it is expected to
increase it in subsequent years as well. Thus, we need to include lagged military expenditure
as another explanatory variable. To account for potential endogeneity and the bias caused
by the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable, the paper uses the Arellano and Bond
(1991) estimation technique. Arellano and Bond (1991) propose an estimation technique
that corrects not only for the bias introduced by the lagged endogenous variable, but also
permits a certain degree of endogeneity in the other explanatory variables. The analysis
shows that the presence of a military ruler does not have a statistically signicant e¤ect
on military expenditure. On the other hand, military spending shows a high degree of
persistence as lagged military spending has a statistically signicant positive coe¢cient.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 discusses the literature
survey, section 3 includes the description of the data, section 4 includes the empirical estima-
tion, the robustness tests and the sensitivity analysis, and section 5 concludes. References
and tables are included thereafter.
2 Literature
This paper comes at the intersection of two strands of literature. The rst examines the
e¤ect of military rule on economic and political outcomes, while the second explores the
determinants of military expenditure. Our paper is the rst attempt in the literature
to examine the relationship between military rule and military spending in sub-Saharan
Africa. Even though some studies attempt to explore the e¤ect of the system of governance
on defense spending, this paper focuses specically on the e¤ect of military rule. This
allows the paper to examine whether the relationship is an example of a capture e¤ect, is
an outcome of the confrontational climate of the cold war, or is driven by the e¤ort by
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military rulers for self-preservation.
The rst stream of literature argues that an increase in defense spending can have ad-
verse e¤ects on the economy as it diverts scarce resources from spending on human capital,
increases the leverage of the armed forces compared to other political actors, allows rulers
to strengthen the military to suppress any opposition which curbs democratic governance,
and allows the military institution to impose rulers with military credentials which hinders
civilian governance. On the other hand, an increase in military spending can ensure polit-
ical stability, provides a deterrence against enemies from contemplating any aggression on
the country, o¤ers protection from internal and external threats, allows for the development
of new technologies that can be used in the war e¤ort or in the private sector, provides
public infrastructure, and increases employment in the defense sector.
As the theoretical relationship between defense spending and economic outcomes seems
inconclusive, many studies attempt an empirical estimation. In this context, few studies
nd that defense spending is conducive to economic growth, such as Benoit (1973, 1978)
who show that countries with a heavy defense burden have the highest growth rates. On
the other hand, a plethora of studies nd that defense spending hinders economic growth,
such as Lim (1983), Smith (1980), Deger and Smith (1983), Deger (1986), Deger and Sen
(1983), Faini et al. (1984), Mintz and Huang,(1990, 1991), Chang et al. (2011), , Huang et
al. (2017), dAgostino et al. (2017), and Ortiz et al. (2019). Others concluded that there
is no signicant e¤ect of defense spending on economic outcomes as in Biswas and Ram
(1986), Desli et al. (2017), and Dunne and Smith (2019).
The second stream of literature is concerned with identifying the determinants of mili-
tary expenditure with a special focus on the system of governance. For instance, Töngür
et al. (2015) nd that social democratic systems have a tendency to spend less on arma-
ments as a share of national income while all other political regimes have higher defense
burdens. The authors conclude that this indicates a negative association between the level
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of democracy and military expenditure. Albalate et al. (2012) investigate the e¤ects of gov-
ernment form and electoral rules on military spending. The authors show that presidential
democracies spend more than parliamentary ones on defense, whereas its interaction with a
majoritarian electoral rule decreases the defense burden. Yildrim and Sezgin (2005) exam-
ine the hypothesis that democracy decreases the likelihood of conict between countries and
that democracies allocate less of their scarce resources to defence purposes. The authors
show that a higher degree of democracy is associated with lower levels of military expendi-
ture. Brauner (2015) examines whether military expenditure is correlated with democracy.
The authors nds that it is democracy that Granger causes military expenditure and not
the other way around. Bove and Brauner (2016) examine whether there are systematic
di¤erences in defense spending between di¤erent types of autocratic regimes. The authors
conclude that military regimes should have the highest, whereas personalist dictatorships
should have the lowest, level of defense spending.
There are also other studies that examine the e¤ect of the abundance of natural resources
on military expenditure. Bove et al. (2018) show that the volume of arms transfers to a
specic country is a¤ected by the degree of dependence on its supply of oil, which instigates
arms exports to oil-abundant countries. This nding implies that the abundance of oil
creates incentives for oil producers to buy weapons to protect their natural wealth. Cotet
and Tsui (2013) examine the e¤ect of oil wealth on political violence using a historical
dataset of oil discoveries. The authors nd that oil wealth is signicantly correlated with
defense spending in nondemocratic countries.
The closest paper to ours is Bove and Nisticò (2014a) who investigate the e¤ect of the
armed forces involvement in politics on budgetary allocations for defence. The authors nd
that a higher degree of military interference in policy-making increases the probability that
the military obtain a larger share of output. Our paper deviates from this contribution in
the main variable of interest. In their paper, the authors use subjective estimates of the level
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of military intervention in the decision-making of the government, while we use an objective
estimate of the presence of military rule. The other contribution that is closer to ours is
Stadelmann et al. (2015) who investigate whether politicians with a military background
vote di¤erently on military a¤airs. The authors nd that politicians who served in the
armed forces have a higher probability of supporting legislative proposals that promote
military a¤airs, even after controlling for party a¢liations and the revealed preferences of
their constituents. Our paper is also di¤erent from this paper as we focus on the e¤ect of
military rule on military spending, but not on legislations that might promote the interests
of the armed forces but might not be directly related to military spending. Our paper also
di¤ers from these studies as it also attempts to explain whether the association between
military rule and military spending reects a capture e¤ect, is an outcome of the cold war
climate, or is an indication of self-preservation e¤orts by military rulers.
3 Data
The sub-Saharan African countries included in the analysis are: Angola, Benin, Botswana,
Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Repub-
lic of Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Cote Divoire, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea,
Ethiopia, Eritrea, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia,
Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria,
Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda,
Zambia, Zimbabwe. The period of the analysis is 1975-2000. The summary statistics of the
variables used in the analysis are included in table 1.
9
3.1 Military Expenditure
The dependent variable is military expenditure as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product
GDP. This variable is derived from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SIPRI. The military expenditure data include all current and capital expenditure on "(a) the
armed forces, including peacekeeping forces; (b) defence ministries and other government
agencies engaged in defence projects; (c) paramilitary forces, when judged to be trained
and equipped for military operations; and (d) military space activities. This should include
expenditure on: i. personnel, including salaries of military and civil personnel, retirement
pensions of military personnel, and social services for personnel; ii. operations and mainte-
nance; iii. procurement; iv. military research and development; v. military infrastructure
spending, including military bases. and; vi. military aid (in the military expenditure of the
donor country). Civil defence and current expenditures on previous military activities, such
as veterans benets, demobilization, conversion and weapon destruction are excluded."
3.2 Military Ruler
The presence of a military ruler is captured by a dummy variable equal to one for military
rule and zero otherwise. Data are derived from the Authoritarian Regime data set version
5. Detailed description of the data is included in Hadenius and Teorell (2007) and Wahman
et al. (2013).
3.3 Controls
Several control variables are used in the analysis to test the robustness of the results. These
are political, economic, and social factors that are known in the literature to explain the
variations in the level of defense spending. The rst variable used is Real Gross Domestic
Product GDP per capita which is derived from the Penn World Tables version 6.3. The
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logarithm of real Gross Domestic Product per capita is used in the analysis. We expect
that developed countries either choose a higher defense spending given that they can a¤ord
it compared to developing countries, or instead prefer to allocate their resources to other
types of spending that allow them to maintain their higher living standards.
Another variable used is trade openness which is proxied by (Exports + Imports)/GDP
derived from the Penn World Tables 6.3. Greater involvement in international trade de-
creases the incentive for armed conict, and accordingly it is expected to have an adverse
e¤ect on defense spending. We also include a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the
share of oil export exceeds 10% and 0 otherwise. This oil dummy is extracted from the
CIA Factbook. The abundance of oil can create incentives to increase the level of defense
spending to protect this type of natural wealth.
We use a democracy variable extracted from the Polity IV Project. The Polity score
captures a countrys political regime on a 21-point scale ranging from -10 (strongly auto-
cratic) to +10 (strongly democratic). As shown in the literature survey, several studies
argued that a democratic system is less likely to engage in conict and, thus, democratic
governance is expected to be associated with lower levels of defense spending. The ethnic
fractionalization indicator is derived from Alesina et al. (2003)1. Fractionalization measures
the probability that two randomly selected individuals from a country are from di¤erent
ethnic groups. Several studies nd that heterogeneity along ethnic lines can lead to ethnic
conict, and thus is expected to be accompanied by an increase in defense spending. We
also use the number of years under armed conicts, derived from UCDP/PRIO Armed
Conict Data set2. The longer the country su¤ers from previous armed conict, the higher
the expected level of defense spending.
1The dataset can be found at: http://www.anderson.ucla.edu/faculty_pages/romain.wacziarg/papersum.html
2https://www.prio.org/Data/Armed-Conict/UCDP-PRIO/
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4 Estimation
4.1 Baseline Results
In this section, we empirically estimate the e¤ect of the presence of a military ruler on
military expenditure as follows
MExpenditureit =  + MRulerit 1 +Xit 1 + i + t + "it (1)
whereMExpenditureit is military expenditure as a percentage of Gross Domestic Prod-
uct in country i in year t. MRulerit 1 is a dummy for the presence of a military ruler in
country i in year t  1. Xit 1 is a vector of control variables in country i in year t  1. i is
the unobserved time-invariant individual country e¤ect, such as historical or institutional
factors. The t denotes a full set of time e¤ects that capture common shocks to defense
spending of all countries. "it is the error term capturing all other omitted factors, such that
E(eit) = 0 for all i and t.
The baseline results are included in table 2. Columns 1-3 of table 2 include the pooled
OLS estimation results while columns 4-5 of table 2 include the xed e¤ects OLS estimation
results. The pooled OLS is identical to our regression equation except for the omission of
the xed e¤ects that reect country dummies. These country dummies capture any time-
invariant country characteristics that a¤ect defense spending. When the true model is
given by our regression equation, and the is are correlated with MRulerit 1 or Xit 1,
then pooled OLS estimates are biased and inconsistent. More specically, let Xjit 1 denote
the jth component of the vector Xit 1 and let Cov denote population covariances. Then,
if either Cov (MRulerit 1; i + "it) 6= 0 or Cov
 
X
j
it 1; i + "it

6= 0 for some j, the OLS
estimator will be inconsistent. On the other hand, even when these covariances are non
zero, the xed e¤ects estimator will be consistent if Cov (MRulerit 1; "it) = Cov
 
X
j
it 1; "it

= 0 for all j (asT !1). In this context, even though the xed e¤ects estimator is more
12
consistent, we do not assume that the xed e¤ects estimations indicate a causal e¤ect of
the presence of military rule on military expenditure. We discuss and deal with this issue
later.
The results in table 2 of the pooled OLS and xed e¤ects OLS show that the presence
of a military ruler has a statistically signicant negative e¤ect in all specications. This is
not consistent with the ndings of Bove and Brauner (2016) who nd a higher demand for
defense spending in autocratic countries with monarchies and military regimes compared to
those with single party rule. This result implies that military rulers attempt to preempt a
subsequent military coup by stripping their peers from resources. Military rulers may also
allocate these resources toward satisfying the demands of the civilians to gain their support
against any potential threat from the military establishment.
Table 2 also shows that GDP per capita has a signicant negative e¤ect in the pooled
OLS estimation, which indicates that a more developed country is expected to dedicate a
larger portion of its income to other types of spending, compared to military expenditure,
that allows it to sustain its higher living standards. The oil dummy has a positive e¤ect in
the pooled OLS estimations which implies that oil producing countries are more tempted to
increase their defense spending to protect their natural wealth. The results also show that
the occurrence of conict increases defense spending in all specications. Fractionalization,
however, has a signicant negative e¤ect in all specications. This could be attributed to
the fact that some studies argue that the variable that capture the likelihood of conict
is ethnic polarization and not ethnic fractionalization. The openness and the democracy
variables, however, do not have statistically signicant coe¢cients.
4.2 Sensitivity Analysis
We conduct a sensitivity analysis where we consider the e¤ect of the presence of a military
ruler on military expenditure that is above or below certain percentiles using xed e¤ects
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OLS estimations. The outcome of this sensitivity analysis is included in table 3. Columns
1-3 show the xed e¤ects OLS estimation results using White (1980) heteroskedasticity
correction. Columns 4-6 of table 3 include the xed e¤ects OLS estimation results using
robust standard errors clustered by country. The results show that military rule has a
statistically signicant negative e¤ect on military expenditure in columns 1-3 using White
(1980) heteroskedasticity correction..
Our sensitivity analysis also considers the relationship between military rule and military
spending during the cold war and in the post cold war era, after 1990. This is because it is
possible that the relationship is driven by the confrontational atmosphere during the cold
war. This is signicant in the context of sub-Saharan Africa which has been one of the
arenas of confrontation between the two super powers during the cold war. Columns 1-2
of table 4 show the pooled OLS results before and after the end of the cold war. Columns
3-4 of table 4 show the xed e¤ects OLS estimation results before and after the end of the
cold war. The results show that the coe¢cient is signicantly negative before and after
the end of the cold war in columns 1-2, and insignicant in columns 3-4. Thus, we observe
that there is no signicant di¤erence between the e¤ect before and after the end of the cold
war. This implies that the relationship between military rule and military expenditure is
not driven by the cold war climate.
4.3 Persistence and Endogeneity
We also consider the possibility of persistence in military spending. When countries increase
their spending on weapons and armaments in one year, they are expected to increase their
defense spending in subsequent years. This is because the purchase of weapons in one
year is expected to be followed by the purchase of ammunitions in subsequent years, the
procurement of armaments in one year is expected to be followed by an increase in employing
and training those who will use them in the following years, and the acquisition of war
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materiel in one year is also expected to be followed by continuous spending on parts, on
maintenance of the military arsenal, and on weaponry upgrades as well. Thus, we include
in our estimation lagged military expenditure as another explanatory variable as follows
MExpenditureit =  + MRulerit 1 +Xit 1 + MExpenditureit 1 + i + t + "it (2)
The standard techniques that can be employed for panel estimation, such as xed e¤ects
and random e¤ects, cannot be used in this case. The problem with these techniques is that
the equation contains a lagged endogenous variable, which is lagged military expenditure.
In this case, estimation by xed e¤ects and random e¤ects is not consistent. In addition,
we also have the problem of endogeneity of military rule. As much as the presence of a
military ruler can increase military spending to suppress any opposition and to ensure the
loyalty of the top brass, it is also possible that an increase in military spending provides
the armed forces enough power to impose a ruler from its ranks.
To deal with potential endogeneity and the lagged dependent variable, we use the Arel-
lano and Bond (1991) estimation technique. This technique not only corrects for the bias
introduced by the lagged endogenous variable but also allows for a certain degree of endo-
geneity in the other explanatory variables. This generalized method of moments (GMM)
estimator rst-di¤erences each variable so as to eliminate the country specic e¤ect and
then uses all possible lagged values of each of the variables as instruments. Table 5 includes
the outcome of the Arellano and Bond (1991) estimation. Column 1 includes the results
of the entire sample, column 2 includes the results during the cold war, and column 3 in-
cludes the results after the end of the cold war. The results show that the coe¢cient for
the presence of a military ruler is negative but not statistically signicant for the whole
sample. In addition, the coe¢cients before and after the end of the cold war are not sig-
nicantly di¤erent. The analysis also provides evidence for a high degree of persistence, as
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the coe¢cient of lagged military spending is statistically signicant and positive.
4.4 Additional Controls
To test the robustness of our results, we also include other control variables that may
a¤ect defense spending such as coup dtats and terrorism. Military rulers in a country that
witnesses recurrent coup detats will be induced to either increase military expenditure to
protect themselves from any potential threats or alternatively decrease defense spending to
limit the ability of their peers in the armed forces to overthrow them in a military coup. In
this context, Bove and Nisticò (2014b) explore how political changes through coup détats
can a¤ect military expenditure. The authors nd that successful coups lead to a large
increase in the military burden, unless a democratization process is triggered by the coup.
The authors also show that failed coups produce a smaller positive e¤ect on the military
burden as the incumbent attempts to avert further challenges by buying o¤ the military.
Leon (2014) examines the relationship between military spending and coups. The author
nds that successful coups increase military spending by more than failed ones, and argues
that this is evidence that the military may stage coups in order to increase its resources.
Therefore, we use an indicator of coup detats from Bjørnskov and Rode (2020). The
authors dene a coup detat as follows. "First, the objective must be to overthrow the
executive branch. Second, actors have to be previously linked to the state apparatus in
some way. Third, a coup or coup attempt cannot last longer than a week at most. To enter
the data, the authors require that a coup attempt is veriable by more than one source,
and the information on failed coups in the sources cannot only derive from the incumbent
government. The authors also do not include any events in which there were rumors of an
attempt or coup plots for which no independent information exists." The coup indicators
include four numerical variables capturing the number of coups in a country in a given year
(All coups), the number of coup attempts that were successful (Successful coups) or failed
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(Failed coups), and an indicator of whether any more coup attempt occurred (First coup,
Second coup, Third coup). In total, the coup database includes 498 country-years in which
coups occurred.
We also include another variable that indicates fatalities due to terrorist incidents.
Countries that su¤er frequent terrorist attacks may be induced to use the power of the
armed forces to suppress the ability of extremist groups to execute such attacks. This
may lead to an increase in military expenditure. In this context, we include a variable for
terrorism derived from the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses
to Terrorism (START) and the Global Terrorism Database3. This variable indicates the
number of total conrmed fatalities in a terrorism incident. The number includes "all
victims and attackers who died as a result of the incident. When there is evidence of
fatalities but the gure is not reported or is too vague to be of use, the observation is
left blank. If information is missing on the number of victims killed in an attack, but
perpetrator fatalities are known, the value reects only the number of perpetrators who
died in the incident. If information is missing on the number of perpetrators killed in
an attack, but victim fatalities are known, the value reects only the number of victims
who died in the incident. Where several independent sources report di¤erent numbers of
casualties, the database reect the number o¤ered by the most recent source unless it is of
questionable validity or if the source bases its numbers on claims by the perpetrators."
Table 6 includes the results after adding the indicators for coup detats and the number
of total conrmed fatalities of terrorist incidents. Column 1 of table 6 includes the results of
the xed e¤ects OLS estimation using White (1980) heteroskedasticity correction. Column
2 of table 6 includes the results of the xed e¤ects OLS estimation using robust standard
errors clustered by country. Column 3 of table 6 includes the Arellano and Bond (1991)
estimation results. The results show that the presence of military rule has a statistically
3National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). Global terrorism
database (GTD). www.start .umd.edu/gtd/.
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signicant negative e¤ect on military expenditure in the xed e¤ects OLS estimations, but
not a signicant e¤ect in the Arellano and Bond (1991) estimation. The results also show
that the coup detats and the terrorism indicators do not have signicant e¤ects on military
expenditure. The insignicant e¤ect of the terrorism variable could be attributed to the
fact that authorities usually react to terrorist attacks through an increase in police and
law enforcement presence, rather than an increase in reliance on the armed forces. The
insignicant e¤ect of the coup detat indicator could be due to the fact that in countries
facing recurrent coups the increase in military expenditure by the military establishment
following a coup in some cases could be o¤set by a cut in military expenditure to limit the
potential of another coup in other cases.
5 Conclusion
This paper examines the e¤ect of the presence of a military ruler on military expenditure,
and whether the relationship reects a capture e¤ect, is an outcome of the cold war con-
frontational climate, or indicates an e¤ort for self-preservation by the military ruler. A
military ruler could have more of an incentive to strengthen the armed forces to stay in
power, to suppress any opposition, to maintain the loyalty of the top brass, and to earn
commissions on arms procurement. A military ruler could also decrease defense spending
to limit the ability of his peers to challenge his power.
The Pooled OLS and xed e¤ects OLS estimations shows that the presence of a ruler
from a military background has a statistically signicant negative e¤ect on military expen-
diture as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product. The sensitivity analysis also shows that
the results are not signicantly di¤erent in the cold war and the post cold war era. This
shows that the association between military rule and military spending reects neither a
capture e¤ect nor an outcome of the cold war climate, but rather an e¤ort by military rulers
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for self-preservation.
To deal with potential endogeneity and the inclusion of the lagged military spending
in the analysis, we use the Arellano and Bond (1991) estimation technique that corrects
for the bias introduced by the lagged endogenous variable and permits a certain degree of
endogeneity in the other explanatory variables. The estimation results show a negative but
insignicant association between the presence of a military ruler and military expenditure,
while military spending shows a high degree of persistence. The ndings of our paper
emphasize the shortcomings of previous studies that attempted an investigation of the e¤ect
of the political regimes on defense spending without examining what drives the relationship
or properly addressing the issues of endogeneity and persistence in military spending.
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Variable Observations Mean Standard Deviation Min Max
Military Expenditure 1,119 2.636483 3.094549 0.0000171 34.37777
Military Ruler 1,119 0.411975 0.4924107 0 1
GDP per capita 1,119 7.457909 0.7724308 5.743135 10.04608
Fractionalization 1,119 0.6917568 0.1809393 0.255 0.9302
Oil 1,119 0.1403038 0.3474573 0 1
Openness 1,119 63.87472 33.94327 4.830907 196.3923
Conict 1,119 0.2314567 0.4219521 0 1
Polity 1,098 -6.410747 19.39419 -88 10
Coup detat 1,088 o.0854779 0.310874 0 2
Terrorism 385 66.91429 159.8913 0 1571
Table 1: Statistical Summaries
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Pooled OLS Fixed effects OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Militaryt-1 -0.864*** -0.986*** -1.017*** -0.986* -1.017*
(0.231) (0.226) (0.232) (0.585) (0.601)
GDP per capita t-1 -0.509** -0.561*** -0.543*** -0.561 -0.543
(0.214) (0.212) (0.210) (0.633) (0.626)
Fractionalization t-1 -2.521*** -2.538*** -2.579*** -2.538*** -2.579**
(0.304) (0.303) (0.309) (0.933) (0.963)
Oil dummy t-1 0.705** 0.806** 0.702** 0.806 0.702
(0.339) (0.339) (0.318) (0.804) (0.726)
Conflict t-1 2.439*** 2.544*** 2.565*** 2.544*** 2.565***
(0.355) (0.354) (0.355) (0.615) (0.599)
Democracy t-1 -0.001 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.003
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007)
Openness t-1 0.006 0.008* 0.006 0.008 0.006
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.010) (0.010)
Year No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country No No Yes No Yes
Constant 7.538*** 91.532*** 93.792*** 91.532*** 93.792***
(1.561) (14.409) (14.542) (26.034) (26.328)
R
2
0.135 0.149 0.156 0.149 0.156
Observations 1.023 1.023 1.023 1.023 1.023
Robust to heteroskedasticity White White White
Clustered
by country
Clustered by
country
significance: 0.01 - ***; 0.05 -
**; 0.1 - *;
Table 2: Pooled OLS and Fixed E¤ects OLS Estimations
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Fixed effects OLS Fixed effects OLS
ME > 5
Percentiles
ME < 95
Percentiles
ME > 5
Percentiles
and ME < 95
Percentiles
ME > 5
Percentiles
ME < 95
Percentiles
ME > 5
Percentiles
and ME < 95
Percentiles
Militaryt-1 -0.977*** -0.234** -0.164* -0.977 -0.234 -0.164
(0.236) (0.094) (0.091) (0.620) (0.256) (0.250)
GDP per capita t-1 -0.396* 0.125* 0.354*** -0.396 0.125 0.354*
(0.224) (0.070) (0.067) (0.641) (0.274) (0.182)
Fractionalization t-1 -2.723*** -2.265*** -2.468*** -2.723*** -2.265*** -2.468***
(0.312) (0.223) (0.214) (0.965) (0.638) (0.532)
Oil dummy t-1 0.733** 0.225 0.136 0.733 0.225 0.136
(0.328) (0.151) (0.141) (0.723) (0.396) (0.314)
Conflict t-1 2.672*** 1.114*** 1.207*** 2.672*** 1.114*** 1.207***
(0.360) (0.113) (0.105) (0.617) (0.214) (0.193)
Democracy t-1 0.004 -0.008*** -0.007*** 0.004 -0.008** -0.007**
(0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003)
Openness t-1 0.007* -0.001 0.001 0.007 -0.001 0.001
(0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.010) (0.004) (0.003)
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 107.937*** 65.733*** 75.434*** 107.937*** 65.733*** 75.434***
(14.946) (9.249) (8.840) (29.040) (18.800) (19.094)
Observations 976.000 970.000 923.000 976.000 970.000 923.000
R
2
0.166 0.227 0.308 0.166 0.227 0.308
Robust to heteroskedasticity White White White
Clustered by
country
Clustered by
country
Clustered by
country
significance: 0.01 - ***; 0.05
- **; 0.1 - *
Table 3: Sensitivity Analysis: E¤ect on di¤erent values of ME (Military
expenditure as a percentage of GDP).
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Pooled OLS Fixed effects OLS
Cold War
Post Cold
War
Cold War
Post Cold
War
Militaryt-1 -0.746*** -1.202*** -0.746 -1.202
(0.286) (0.314) (0.552) (0.803)
GDP per capita t-1 -0.572*** -0.588** -0.572 -0.588
(0.193) (0.293) (0.438) (0.871)
Fractionalization t-1 -2.293*** -2.872*** -2.293* -2.872***
(0.506) (0.424) (1.155) (1.054)
Oil dummy t-1 1.711** 0.083 1.711 0.083
(0.746) (0.279) (1.272) (0.646)
Conflict t-1 2.824*** 2.398*** 2.824*** 2.398***
(0.499) (0.498) (0.815) (0.782)
Democracy t-1 -0.004 0.004 -0.004 0.004
(0.007) (0.006) (0.009) (0.010)
Openness t-1 0.000 0.015** 0.000 0.015
(0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.017)
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant -107.379* 124.396*** -107.379 124.396**
(54.784) (38.936) (99.614) (48.606)
R
2
0.190 0.179 0.190 0.179
Observation 460 563 460 563
Robust to heteroskedasticity White White
Clustered by
country
Clustered by
country
significance: 0.01 - ***; 0.05 -
**; 0.1 - *
Table 4: Sensitivity Analysis: Cold war and Post Cold war.
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Whole
Sample
Cold War
Post Cold
War
Militaryt-1 -0.146 0.125 -0.412
(0.280) (0.443) (0.273)
GDP per capita t-1 0.773 -1.158 1.587***
(0.508) (1.092) (0.586)
Fractionalization t-1 -75.081 51.352
(212.544) (184.900)
Oil dummy t-1 0.688 0.839 0.916**
(0.481) (1.023) (0.430)
Conflict t-1 0.347 -1.127 1.016
(0.621) (1.252) (0.669)
Democracy t-1 0.002 -0.002 0.003
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Openness t-1 -0.011 -0.006 -0.011
(0.010) (0.015) (0.008)
Military Expenditure t-1 0.469*** 0.679*** 0.272***
(0.072) (0.070) (0.081)
Year Yes Yes Yes
Observations 954 418 536
AR(2) 0.247 0.375 0.161
Hansen test 1.000 1.000 1.000
significance: 0.01 - ***; 0.05 -
**; 0.1 - *
Table 5: Arellano and Bond (1991) Estimation.
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Fixed
effects OLS
Fixed
effects OLS
Arellano-
Bond
Militaryt-1 -0.515* -0.515 0.109
(0.307) (0.494) (0.287)
Coups d’etat t-1 -0.025 -0.025 -0.504
(0.339) (0.294) (0.451)
Terrorism t-1 0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Military expenditure t-1 0.259***
(0.035)
Constant 196.256*** 196.256***
(32.390) (41.897)
Year Yes Yes Yes
Country Yes Yes Yes
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes
Observations 354 354 229
R
2
0.304 0.304
AR(2) 0.293
Hansen test 1.000
Robust to heteroskedasticity White
Clustered by
country
significance: 0.01 - ***; 0.05 -
**; 0.1 - *
Table 6: Sensitivity Analysis: Additional Control Variables.
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